316-317 对策
316-317 对策
低沉的军号呜呜鸣响，惊醒了沉睡中的大营。
朝廷大军连夜拔营后撤，十几万兵马人声马嘶地吵闹了足足一夜，军队在大道上蜿蜒成一条不见首尾的长龙，到天明时，闹腾了一夜的大营终于重又陷入沉寂，本来驻扎了十几万兵马的营地已变得空荡荡的。
并非所有的兵马都撤退了，为防止东平军追击骚扰，皇帝慕容破还是在大营留下了一部分留守部队，为数总约莫十个旅的兵马。天明时分，接到留守命令的旅帅们纷纷聚到了中军大营，参见留守总帅、兵部尚书慕容淮。
对兵部尚书慕容淮来说，刚刚过去的这一晚，是艰难和痛苦的一夜。他被赋予了重大的权力，代表皇命的尚方宝剑就摆在他面前的案上，那把乌黑的长剑散发着无形的威力，令将军们不敢凛然正视；但他也承担了沉重的担子和巨大的压力，大魏朝的社稷安危就系在了他的肩上，令他身心疲惫，一夜之间，他头上的白发已添了不少。因为缺乏睡眠，他眼中满是血丝，头疼欲裂。
对着聚来的旅帅们，慕容淮简单地颁布了命令：因平叛战役已经告捷，陛下已率王师主力返回洛京。为掩护王师主力撤退，我部将暂时留守行营驻地，诸位将军务必提高警戒，等候进一步命令。
听着慕容淮颁令，将军们都是神情严峻——旅帅级别的将领，已经有资格与闻军机了。最近，东平军与朝廷之间的紧张关系，皇帝慕容破突然在半夜里紧急拔营回师，大军撤退得如此仓惶，简直跟逃离没啥两样。将军们不清楚皇帝仓惶撤离的真正原因，但这并不妨碍他们猜出真相：肯定有某种迫在眉睫的重大危机正在逼近！
听完颁令，邙山旅旅帅胡南道：“堂部大人，请问。您要末将等提高警惕提防的，是否就是孟太保的东平军？”
慕容淮面无表情，轻轻点头、
堂下轰地闹腾起来，将军们嗡嗡地议论：“陛下撤了，主力也撤了，我们留下来挡北疆孟大都督，那不是等死吗？”
“万人敌孟大都督，哪个敢挡他？那不是找死吗？”
“东平军把斗铠单独编军。厉害得很，几万边军都顶不住一个冲击。”
眼见众将议论声越来越响，慕容淮注视众人，缓缓道：“疾风知劲草，板荡识忠臣。朝廷高薪厚禄善待诸位，不曾有过半点亏待，如今，朝廷遭遇艰难，正是诸位回报朝廷之时了，何来如此纷扰？”
慕容淮声量不高。语气也不甚严厉，但这位身形瘦削的老人散发着淡淡的凛威。帐中众将慢慢静了下来。
“吾等为朝廷王师，唯贼是讨。无论来敌何人，无论他是何等高官厚爵，有着怎样的赫赫名声，只要他与朝廷为敌，那便是吾辈之敌。我们有十旅强兵在此，行营工事墙坚堑深。固若金汤，一应防御器械齐备。只要诸位将军齐心协力，谨慎小心。任凭敌人再强大，又能奈我们如何？”
听出慕容淮的言下之意，留守兵马只需守营防守，无需出营与东平军对攻野战，诸将都是如释重负，众将俯首听命，都说：“谨遵堂部大人钧令。”
“下去吧，回各自营中，点检好兵马。敌人可能会在午后来袭，诸君做好准备。”
众将纷纷离营散去，唯有一员英武的青年将军留在原地。慕容淮也不理他，只是闭上眼睛，缓缓揉着额头，缓解着头脑中的剧痛。
那员青年将军轻轻走到慕容淮身后，卷起军袍袖子，熟练地帮他按起头部的穴位来。随着他渐渐用力，慕容淮呻吟了两声，紧蹙的眉头却是渐渐舒展开来了。
“爹爹，您的头疼病又犯了吗？”
慕容淮闭着眼：“昨晚没睡好，今早确实疼得厉害。真儿，头顶往上一点按——跟你说多少次，在军中莫要叫我爹爹。我是兵部的正堂，你是兵部隶属的旅帅，咱们得避嫌着些。”
勇骁旅旅帅慕容真笑道：“爹爹真要公私分明，孩儿可要走了。天下哪有给上官按头的旅帅？”
“嘿，你这个逆子，连爹爹都不放眼里了——哎哟，就是那处！你用力按，哎哟疼死爹爹了！”
按了一阵，慕容淮头疼稍缓，他摆手：“行了，真儿，停手了吧。”
“爹爹，陛下为什么要连夜返京呢？”
慕容淮望了一眼自己的儿子，然后，他很快又闭上了眼睛：“真儿，你是武官，讨贼杀敌才是你的本分，陛下行止原因，不是你们武官该打听的。”
“可是，大伙都说，陛下就是怕了东平大都督，不然不会连夜撤营，走得这么急。。。”
“住口！天子之剑，威加海内，拓跋皇叔叛乱鼎盛之时，号称大军五十万，陛下连这么大的叛乱都给扑灭了，又怎会惧怕只有三万兵马的东平镇藩？我朝的福泽深厚，根基牢固，不是任何野心狂徒能动摇的。”
慕容淮叱责道，慕容真脸露不忿：“但爹爹，三伯伯对您也太不公了。他自己带着大军走了，却把您留下来抵挡孟大都督，这分明是借刀。。。”
慕容淮突然睁开眼，他以严厉的眼神制止了自己的儿子，然后，他望着桌面上那把黑色的尚方宝剑，注视良久，缓缓说：“雷霆雨露，皆是君恩。真儿，这种话，你今后千万莫要再提。陛下赐我尚方宝剑，准许我自行独断行事，这是莫大的信重。君恩如此深重，为父也只能鞠躬尽瘁，竭力而报了。”
“爹爹，陛下准许你便宜行事，授予了您多大的权限？”
慕容淮望着自己儿子，不动声色：“与东平军交涉的一切事宜，吾皆可自主。”
慕容真喜形于色：“爹爹，这样就好了！只要我们答应东平军的要求，交几个人出去，那不就没事了？
三伯伯肯定也是希望你这样做的。因为爹爹您一向主张对东平军怀柔，所以他才把这个任务交给您啊！肯定是这样的！”
慕容淮站起身，缓缓走到帐前。他望着远方碧蓝的天空，久久伫立。良久，他转过身来，对儿子说：“真儿，勿要妄测天心。”
“可是——”
“陛下的用意，不是吾辈臣子该妄自揣测的。现在，既然陛下把与东平军交涉的任务交给了我，那为父想的，就是全力把差使办好了。其他的事，为父不考虑。
为父先前对东平怀柔，那是因为东平军是我大魏的有力镇藩，孟太保是大魏的有功之臣。如今，东平军咄咄逼人，目无朝廷，我们现在还谈什么怀柔，那是徒为人笑柄了。”
“爹爹，朝廷跟东平冲突，死了几个人，这并不是什么大事啊。只要大家好好谈谈，把俘虏还给他们，再赔他们些银两，大家各退一步，事情未必没有转圜的机会。。。何必作那意气之争呢？”
慕容淮哑然失笑：“意气之争？真儿，你还是太年青啊，你还不懂啊！与孟太保的这一仗，迟早要打的。”
笑容一敛，慕容淮转为肃然：“真儿，为了大魏，也为了我们慕容家，这一仗，为父自不量力，就担当起来了！为父已经想了很久，除了为父，确实也没有其他人更合适了！”
比起自己的儿子，慕容淮多了几十年风霜雨雪的阅历，这也使得他看事情更加透彻和犀利。没错，这次的事情表面上看来，只是大魏朝廷与东平军之间的一次偶然摩擦，但更深的原因却是，吸纳叛军兵力之后，北疆大都督孟聚的实力急速跃升，野心随之膨胀。他对朝廷失去了一个臣子应有的敬畏，已有不臣之心。
几十年的人生经历，使得慕容淮深知：大海或许还有尽头，但一个权臣军阀的野心，那是永远不会有止境的。朝廷每向后退一步，孟聚就会跟着进逼一步，朝廷步步退让，只会退无可退，最后还是免不了要打上一仗。与其那样，倒不如现在就开打，不管输赢，起码挫了东平军的锐气，也挫了孟太保的野心，让他知道，朝廷不是让他予取予求的对象。
听出父亲心意已决，慕容真面露忧色，他说：“爹爹，东平孟太保骁勇善战，号称当世第一名将，委实不好对付——爹爹这一仗，有几分胜算？”
慕容淮哈哈一笑：“孟太保是我大魏的头号勇将，勇绝当世，用兵如神。而为父不过慕容家的一介无名老朽，蹉跎半生，一事无成，没想到老还有机会能与当世名将对垒沙场，这实在是为父的荣幸。至于输赢成败，为父早已不介怀了。”
慕容淮说得豁达，其实心中却是早已想好了：打归打，但最终还是要谈的。只是现在找孟聚谈的话，东平军气势正盛，条款肯定对朝廷很不利的。倒不如先打上一仗，挫挫孟聚的锐气再跟他谈。
东平军虽然崛起神速，但家底子毕竟还薄。自己立定营寨，稳守不出，几万兵马怎么也能守上一阵。等东平军屡攻不下，损兵折将之后，孟聚脸皮搁不住，那就该是他急着求朝廷谈判好收场了
六月六日午时，也就是东平军给朝廷设下期限的最后时刻，一名东平军军官奔到了驻马村大营中，询问朝廷对东平军要求的最终答复。
这是和平的最后机会了，但慕容家并不珍惜这个机会。大魏朝兵部尚书慕容淮傲慢地拒绝了这个要求，他甚至都不肯接见东平军的使者，只是吩咐部下：“把这无礼之徒打出去。”
使者被赶走了，半个时辰后，东平军的探哨出现在马坡村的周围。东平军的骑兵三五人一队，在朝廷大营的四周游走，肆无忌惮地贴近观察朝廷大营的防御和工事，甚至奔到了距离大营正门只有十来步的地方打探张望着。
看到东平军的探哨出现，旅帅们都是心中一寒，情知北疆大都督言出必践，报复终于来了！
明知东平军来意不善，但毕竟还没开打，金吾卫也不好主动攻击那些探子。一个骑兵小队被派出驱赶东平军的探子，那个带队的伍正奔过去，嚷道：“此为朝廷军机重地，闲人不得逗留窥探。。。”
话还没说完呢，东平军骑兵便飕飕地射出几箭，当场把那喊话的伍正给射下马来。剩下的军卒大骇，立即调转马头奔回营中。
战斗于是就此打响。
轰然的马蹄声中，金吾卫一营武装骑兵从营中涌出，恶狠狠地向东平军的刺哨们扑过去。眼见敌人势众，东平军的骑兵也不敢应战，一声唿哨后便齐刷刷地向后退去。金吾卫的骑兵眼见机会，立即加鞭紧追。
双方一追一逃间，已经冲出了马坡村的原野，冲到了村边的林子边。东平军骑兵沿着林子边上的小道上逃走，金吾卫紧追不舍，也跟着贴近了树林边。这时，突然听到巨大的轰隆声响起。林中冲出了上百名铠斗士，铺天盖地地朝金吾卫的骑兵猛扑而去。
带队的骑兵营官大惊失色，疾呼：“东平军有埋伏！撤，马上撤！”
但哪里来得及，就在他呼喝间，东平的斗铠已分几队冲进了骑兵队列中，将骑兵队一下截成了几段。铠斗士们呼喝着，佰刀横扫砍斫。将金吾卫骑兵砍杀鲜血横飞，整营骑兵当场就被砍死了一小半，剩下的骑兵被吓得四散逃逸。
战斗刚开始就结束了，剩下的只有野蛮而血腥的逐猎。道路的两边都被铠斗士封住了，为了活命，金吾卫的骑兵纷纷策马冲入田地中逃跑，偏偏那田地有水，泥泞不堪，战马一踩进去，半条马腿都陷进去了。在烂泥里哀鸣嘶叫着无法动弹。
眼见身后的敌人越追越近，金吾卫骑兵有的干脆把武器一抛。原地跪下求饶；有的骑兵跳下马来徒步逃跑，但很少能逃掉的，因为佯逃的东平军探哨也掉头回来，一起参加追剿。
东平军的追击斗铠和骑兵，围成一个巨大的弧形包围圈，犹如围猎野兽一般捕杀金吾卫官兵，有时甚至是十几人乃至几十人来对付一名金吾卫士兵。一时间。战斗声、惨呼声、哀求声惊天动地。金吾卫的骑兵奔逃遁蹿，在田野间纷纷丧命。
大营也看到了这边的情形。数以千计的金吾卫士兵攀在营墙边上，肃穆观战。看到出击的伙伴被东平军如杀猪宰羊一般屠戮着。观战的金吾卫同感恐惧。数千官兵聚集的场所，只听到那沉重而急促的喘息声，不时响起“哦哦”的惊呼声，声中饱含着痛心和震惊。
楚河旅旅帅高楚急忙报告慕容淮：“大帅，东平军出动斗铠伏击我部骑兵，恳请大人允许我军斗铠出击，救回出击的弟兄！”
但慕容淮坚决拒绝了——东平军现在出动的不过区区百来名铠斗士，可能还有更多的斗铠埋伏在左近。如果金吾卫的斗铠被引诱出击的话，那事情就会演变成两军斗铠在平原上野战交锋了，这对金吾卫方面是不利的。
慕容淮铁青着脸下了命令：“无本堂军令，各部斗铠有敢擅自出战者，立斩无赦！”
当着金吾卫整路大军的面，东平军轻轻松松地收拾了出击的金吾卫兵马，出击的斗铠重又退回树林中，而骑兵探哨则再次驱前，又奔到了金吾卫的大营附近，在那里装腔作势地观望着，打探着，挑衅着，而这次，大营的守卫者们只敢在墙头以弩箭来射击驱赶他们，却再没有人来出营来战斗了。
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
夜间，安平城，都督府。
都督府内灯火通明，那欢声笑语隔着几重门户都传了出来。
孟聚坐在大堂首座，旅帅们分列左右，坐在他的下首。坐在孟聚右手边的，是雷霆旅旅帅史文庭，白虎旅旅帅洛小成，横山旅旅帅李澈，飞鹤旅旅帅黄旻，狂狮旅旅帅赵狂等新投部将；而坐在他左手边上的，则是文先生、王虎、齐鹏、徐浩杰等旧部。
将军们会聚一堂，堂中洋溢着一派欢庆的气氛。
孟聚举起杯子，朗声道：“诸位将军，今日我军首战告捷，将士们神勇，将朝廷兵马打得龟缩营中，不敢应战，大涨我军军心士气。我就以茶代酒，敬上诸位一杯。”
将军们纷纷举杯应贺，孟聚特意还敬了史文庭和洛小成二位旅帅一杯，道“辛苦了”——今天诱敌的骑兵是由史文庭旅帅亲自带领的，而在林中埋伏的斗铠则是白虎旅的斗铠，两位旅帅都是受宠若惊，连声说“不敢当”，诚惶诚恐地饮尽杯中。
“虽初战告捷，但行营主力尚存，金吾卫还是强敌，我们仍不可大意。。。行营里不知是谁在坐镇？今日我军想诱敌出击，他倒是很沉得住气啊！”
其实，今天在树林中埋伏的兵马远不止白虎旅，在树林中待命的东平军铠斗士多近两千之众，只要边军斗铠被诱出来，孟聚有把握把他们打得落花流水。但金吾卫大营的指挥官很老练，窥破了自己意图，紧守营寨巍然不动，这让孟聚的算计落空了。
洛小成旅帅站起来。他身形高挑，腿长肩宽，眼深鼻高，一头黄色的长发披散在脑后，有着明显的西域胡人血统，一开口却是字正腔圆的洛京口音：“大都督，末将的部下今天抓到了几个金吾卫的俘虏，他们招供说。慕容家皇帝已在昨晚率主力兵马撤离行营了，现在行营里留守主持的是兵部尚书慕容淮。”
孟聚和文先生对视一眼，两人都面露惊讶。
文先生说：“昨晚行营有大股兵马向南行动，斥候已经回报了，学生是知道的，没想到居然是御驾南返。陛下为何突然南返，洛帅可打探有消息吗？”
“金吾卫军中传言，说他们的皇帝是因为惧怕大都督而连夜逃跑的。”
说着，洛小成对着孟聚单膝跪倒，脸上满是仰慕崇敬之情。他仰望着孟聚。嚷道：“大都督的虎威，即使大魏国的天子亦不敢正面而视。末将实在敬佩！”
众位将军跟着齐齐跪倒：“大都督威武，天下无敌！”
孟聚哈哈笑了两声，他摆手道：“诸位将军请起。这样的话，今后大伙还是要莫要再说了，免得惹外人笑话。”
洛小成说慕容破是被孟聚吓跑的，对这说法，孟聚只能哈哈一笑了——慕容破本身就是身经百战的宿将。历练丰富，冷酷坚定，手握举国重兵。实力远在自己之上。这样的人，会被自己一个恫吓就吓跑？
这种话，孟聚哪怕是喝得再醉都不会相信的——洛小成，你这马屁也拍得太过分了吧？
孟聚转向文先生：“文先生，以您的估计，陛下为何突然班师返南呢？”
文先生沉吟良久，摇头道：“大都督，这件事太过蹊跷，学生也猜想不透缘故。莫非，是南边出了什么变故，陛下要急着回去处理？”
“南边？”孟聚微微一愣：“莫非南朝有何异动，陛下要急着回去？”然后，孟聚立即否定了：“不会，南朝若有动作，这是震惊天下的大事。叶家该会及时通知我的。”
既然想不透，那就不要想。孟聚很快把这疑惑抛开，和众将商议起下一步的战略来。知道朝廷的主力兵马已撤离，现在留在大营中的只有几旅的留守兵马，众将都很是兴奋，跃跃欲试，纷纷请战。
王虎旅帅抢先说：“大都督，朝廷就剩那么点兵马了，我们还等什么呢？明天一早，我们摆开阵势，全军压上，直接攻打行营！末将愿率本部兵马担当先锋，大都督您给末将两个时辰就好，两个时辰，末将保准把行营给您拿下了！”
洛小成旅帅也站起来，他严肃地瞪着王虎：“王帅，你这样说，那可不对了！”
王虎一愣，随即怒气上脸：“洛帅，你是什么意思？你怀疑我王虎办不到？好，那我立下军令状：明天午后，若还拿不下行营，我提头来见大都督！”
洛小成旅帅摇头：“非也！王帅，你骁勇善战，威名远扬，金吾卫那些废物兵决不是你对手。可你要想想，你是大都督身边的老人了，功勋累累，可咱们刚投到大都督麾下，寸功未立，正是满怀心思急着要报效大都督的时候——王帅，您把这次的前锋给抢了，那可是太不应该了，诸位兄弟，大家说是不是？”
众将轰然应是：“洛帅言之有理，王帅，这一趟的前锋，还是请您让出来吧！”
赵狂旅帅更是含着泪嚷道：“王帅，那位被害的高飞旅帅是老夫的八拜兄弟，这次的前锋，求你让给老夫吧！”
众多边军将领七嘴八舌地帮腔，王虎急得脸红耳赤，一个劲地嚷：“休想！你们休想！大都督哪次打仗，咱不是前锋？这是咱们东平军的规矩，你们休想抢了咱的！”
为前锋由谁担当，将军们吵得不可开交，看着他们，孟聚深深蹙起了眉，神色阴沉，微咬下唇，却是一直没开口说话。
他望望左边，恰好与文先生的目光碰个正着。孟聚冲文先生微微眨眼，后者一愣，却是立即恍然。他给孟聚使了个眼色，站起身。朗声道：“诸位将军，诸位将军，请听学生一言。”
但将军们正吵嚷得热乎呢，谁有功夫理睬他啊。最后，孟聚看不下去了，干咳一声，喝道：“都安静了，文先生有话要说。大家都听听！”
众将一愣，王虎粗着嗓子嚷道：“文先生，有啥好事，您就赶紧说呗！咱们还在商量着大事呢。”
孟聚喝道：“虎子，没上没下的！怎么跟先生说话呢？”
王虎吓了一跳，连忙吐吐舌头坐回椅子上，对文先生拱拱手以示求饶，文先生也不在意，他笑吟吟地道：“王帅和诸位将军求战心切，可见我军斗志高昂。学生看着也是心里欢喜，主公不必责怪了。但这次。学生要给大家泼泼冷水了：学生觉得，现在还不是攻打朝廷行营的时候。”
众将一听，顿时炸了，但被孟聚以严厉的眼神镇压，大伙都不敢做声，乖乖地坐回了原位，只是眼中流露出不满和忿忿。
孟聚不动声色：“先生请继续说。”
“是。大伙也知道。驻马村行营当初就是以御营的标准建立的，守备牢固，墙高堑深。营中更备有大量各式重型弩和重型守备斗铠，守军坐拥地利和器械之便，我军以斗铠强攻的话，必然会遭受顽强抵抗。诸位将军虽然骁勇，但要强攻这样的营寨，伤亡怕也肯定不会少吧？”
听文先生这样说，旅帅们都露出凝重的表情。史文庭旅帅肃然道：“文先生，您言之有理。行营守备森严，我们要强攻，肯定是要损折不少弟兄的，但当兵打仗，死人总是免不了的，那也是没办法的事。莫非先生您有何高见，可以让咱们不损兵马就拿下行营？”
文先生笑道：“史帅高看学生了，高见谈不上，馊主意倒是有一个：我军四面围而不攻，切断了行营的补给，把他们团团围住，最后逼得他们出来投降，这个主意如何呢？”
文先生卖了半天关子，大伙儿还以为他有什么惊天动地的妙策呢，没想到最后出的主意却只是老套的“死围”之策，将军们都是脸露失望：这个军师，架子摆得忒大，本事却也平常啊。
“倘若围而不打的话，确实能减少儿郎们的死伤。但这样未免要耗费时日太久了，要围到行营断粮，也不知要等到何年何月啊。”
“就是，这样的耗费也太磨人了，还不如直接攻进去好。”
众人吱吱喳喳地议论了一阵，孟聚最后拍板定调了。他沉重地说：“诸位将军，士兵们也同样是爹妈所生父母所养的，咱们身为军将，需有爱兵之心。倘能减少弟兄们的伤亡，耗费些时日怕什么？这件事，我定了，明日起，咱们就在行营四面设寨，把行营团团围住了，一直围到金吾卫受不了出来投降为止！”
大都督既然定了方略，诸将都是凛然听命。就算有些将领心里不服的，但这毕竟是大都督爱惜麾下士卒的仁心，也只能心里嘀咕：“大都督是个好人，只是未免心肠也太软了些。”
深夜，军略会议结束，诸将纷纷告辞而去，孟聚把众人送到门口。然后，他回到大堂中，看到文先生依然坐在座位上悠然地喝着茶，孟聚长长呼出一口气：“真是累死我了。先生，今晚多谢了。”
“主公何必客气？”文先生放下茶杯，他笑道：“主公，其实学生先前还真些担心怕主公冲动，真要拿下朝廷行营来大杀一通。好在主公您思虑周到，学生却是多虑了。”
孟聚摇头苦笑：“攻下了朝廷行营，杀了几万朝廷兵马，咱们跟慕容家这个梁子就算结深了，以后只怕连谈和的机会都没有。咱们只是要朝廷低头而已，又不是真想跟他们死磕到底——这么浅显的道理，我还是懂的。”
没错，这才是孟聚的真正用意——杀光行营的留守官兵，这件事孟聚是办得到，但这只会让慕容家跟自己结下死仇，对自己一点好处没有。
所以，这场硬仗，孟聚根本就不想打。他更想的是把包括兵部尚书慕容淮在内的三万朝廷兵马困在手里，作为将来跟朝廷谈判的筹码。
只是史文庭、洛小成这帮边军将领复仇心切，一心想着要跟慕容家来个你死我活，群情激奋之下，孟聚也不好意思说不打。好在文先生机敏而善解人意，就在那一眨眼间，他已明白自己的为难之处，不但主动出声帮自己解围，还帮自己想出个“爱惜士卒”的借口，自己才能顺势脱身。
（对不起，上周本来承诺这周有一万二的，但这两天猪的身体不很舒服，冷热感冒，上吐下泻。实在坚持不下来了，这周只赶了八千字。答应大家的事还是做不到，实在对不起，上周的欠债和本周的欠债，有信用的猪都记得了，下周会更新补上的。
再次向大家抱歉。）
日系车车祸死亡率高的六原因
日系车车祸死亡率高的六原因
在中国，日系车车祸率最高，特别是车祸死亡率极高，这其中有六大原因。日系车的普遍特点是：看得见的东东应有尽有，模样精致；看不见的东东能省就省，省不了就换上垃圾凑数。前段时间，有位DX说日系车就好比暗媢，外表光鲜，方便实惠,开（用）起来很爽，但内质肮脏，总让人有不安的感觉，一不小心，就会小命不保。—-我完全赞同这一说法，据笔者多年查考研究：在中国，日系车车祸率最高，特别是车祸死亡率极高。——这些现象的出现，归根结底源于日系车卑鄙阴险的成本核算，也就是偷工减料。根据本人的了解，其成本运作一般有六大伎俩
第一招，在发动机上偷梁换柱，更换劣质或过旧的发动机。
如威驰: 日本原装威驰使用VVTI发动机,一汽丰田威驰使用夏利2000发动机；又如雨燕:作为雨燕精髓的1.3升 91马力 DOHC VVT 发动机没有引进，而是采用国内羚羊使用的1.3升 85马力 SOHC 发动机。从发动机先进性，经济性，及动力输出各个角度来说，都比原装落后很多，但要号称世界同步,价格加倍.这实在是一个败笔，也是人为的故意。
第二招，在操控系统上改头换面。
操控系统最重要的是制动系统，制动系统很大程度决定汽车安全性能。现代中档以上轿车普遍都采用“碟/碟”制动系统，如伊兰特、凯越、奥迪等。注重汽车的安全性能，一定要查看是否采用了ABS（防抱死）刹车系统，ABS系统的版本是否是最新的，采用的是碟刹还是鼓刹。日系车要么均采用国外已经淘汰的早期版本的ABS系统，要么就采用前碟后鼓的制动装置，目的就是为了节约成本。如价格达17、8万的阳光等中档车就是前碟后鼓的制动方式，威驰、飞度等经济型车就更不用说了。与现在最新的ABS系统相比，无论在质还是量上都差了很多，自然成本方面也就少得多了。还有一个容易被人们忽视的就是制动器了，也就是看车辆是碟刹还是鼓刹。鼓刹是指在车辆上采用鼓式制动器，碟刹就是指采用盘/碟式制动器。鼓刹是很久以前就已经采用的了，其优点就是价格便宜，而碟刹比起鼓刹成本要高些，但是在刹车效能方面得以提高，现在国际高档车型都全部采用四轮碟刹。
第三招，在省油技术上能骗就骗。
车辆省油除了与驾驶技术等人为因素相关外，还与发动机性能及轮胎宽度、自重大小等客观因素相关。实验证明：在一般情况下，轮胎每增加10mm，油耗上升2~3个；自重增加100kg，油耗上升1.5~2个。日系奸商大肆宣扬他们的车省油，国内普通消费者也往往不问原因大声附和—–日系车就是比其它车省1~2个，但业内专家都认为日系车其实一点都不省油。试问：如果日系车车胎再增加10mm、自重再增加50kg，它还会省油吗？一个不争的事实：排量超过2.4，那一款日系车都不省油。特别是象三菱一类的越野车，由于日系车在轮胎和自重与欧系车采用共同标准，结果每辆日系车都是油老虎。甚至面包车也是一样，如金杯面包等。
第四招，在发动机功率上能唬就唬。
日系车一般就夸耀其排量小但最大功率比人家大。其实，功率不能衡量发动机好坏。功率大不等于就认为是好车，汽车的最大功率只是评价的一个小指标而已，更重要的是看发动机的动力曲线输出，现在很多车型发动机标称的最大功率只是在极端情况下才能输出，但在正常使用区间就相当不平顺，这样其实没什么实际意义。而且，除了这个最大功率，动力输出曲线这些软性指标、发动机采用的新技术就经常被人们所忽略。发动机成本很大程度上取决于是否是使用了这些新技术。比如发动机电控系统是否最新最先进的，是否采用了国际上最新的电子油门技术（不等同于我们通常所说的电喷技术），是否采用了成本更高但更轻巧的铝合金缸体，在进气排气系统方面是否采用新技术等等，这些新技术的采用直接关系到汽车行驶性能以及油耗和排放的降低，会对消费者日后的使用造成极大影响。
第五招，在内饰上能蒙就蒙。
日系车最热衷于在内饰的部件上迷惑消费者，当消费者坐进车内，第一眼看到的是真皮，又有这样那样的小装备，加上销售员的鼓动，很容易以为内饰部件多，看上去豪华就是好车的主要评判标准，内饰就是决定汽车价格的先决条件，从而忽视了选择一辆汽车真正应该关注的东西。专家指出：在汽车成本计算中，汽车内饰“水分”不大。 汽车内饰方面，由于所涉及的技术含量比较低，相应的配套厂非常多，价格的弹性也很大。了解汽车用品配件市场的朋友就会知道，一套真皮座椅手工连材料从2000-5000元都有，比较好的也只是3500元左右就可以了，CD播放器方面比较不错的6碟CD播放器1000元以下就可以拿到，而这些部件的价值相对于整个车价来说可谓九牛之一毛。消费者其实只要到家具和电器市场比较一下同档次的产品，就可以知道其中的水分有多大。
第六招，在底盘悬挂上能讹就讹。
17万以下的日系车普遍采用前独立悬挂后非独立悬挂的底盘悬挂布局。我们知道，汽车的悬挂系统分为非独立式悬挂和独立式悬挂两种组成。非独立悬挂是将非独立悬挂的车轮装在一根整体车轴的两端。采取这种悬挂系统的汽车一般平稳性和舒适性较差，但由于其构造较简单，生产成本也比较低。独立悬挂是指车轴分成两段，每只车轮用螺旋弹簧独立地安装在车架下面，这样当一边车轮发生跳动时，另一边车轮不受波及，车身的震动大为减少，汽车舒适性也得以很大地提升，尤其在高速路面行驶时，它还可提高汽车的行驶稳定性。不过，这种悬挂构造较复杂，还会连带使汽车的驱动系统、转向系统变得复杂起来，因此成本会增加不少。通过前面的解释，我们可以清楚地知道独立悬挂对于车辆的安全性、舒适性都比非独立悬挂系统好很多，但是成本会高些，因此有些车型就只是在前轮采用了独立悬挂，而后轮就换成了非独立的悬挂系统。说到这，读者就不会奇怪：为什么日系车普遍高速发飘了。
日本车与德国车的真实比较
德国人想的是要把发动机室做坚固，以确保在可能出现的事故中尽量把车的损失减少到最小。而为了人的安全要把驾驶室造的更坚固，以确保在车的损坏不可避免的情况下，还能保证人的安全。本人想的是为了节成本把驾驶室做的越薄越好，只要能保证发动机室比驾驶室更不结实就行–这样就不至于直接把人撞死（安全碰撞试验能过关）。
日本车和德国车以同样的速度撞墙，50公里的时候，日本解说员对驾驶员说：“你看，这是最新科技：发动机下陷技术，保证不会进入驾驶室造成对驾驶员的伤害；这是利用塌缩吸能原理制造的三级吸能结构，确保其通过充分变形来吸碰撞能量以保障驾驶员的安全。”（车已经报废了）。德国的解说员只对驾驶员说了一句话：“看，没问题。”然后是时速100公里，撞完之后德国解说员不好意思地对驾驶员说：“对不起，您的车报废了！”日本解说员大声对驾驶员骂道：“活该你死，开这么快，你还敢撞墙？”
而这两辆车带给人的直接区别是：日本车每百公里省1-2个油，每开出一万公里，日本车少花几百块油钱–前提是别有事故，因为一有事故，日本车用于修车甚至换车的综合费用要比德国车高很多。（不要只看到德国车的一个保险杠是日本车的几倍，德国车需要换保险杠的时候，换成是日本车可能已经报废了！！）
想一想你买车花了多少钱，你每年能开多少万公里，你就知道省这点油钱对你有没有意义！人要懂得珍惜自己的生命。就像日本人为了保护自己的森林资源，一定要从中国进口一次性筷子一样。日本人为了赚取更大的利润，是尤其不会在乎你中国人的死活的！！！
Tor manual
SYNOPSIS
tor [OPTION value]…
DESCRIPTION
tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and negotiate a “virtual circuit” through the network, in which each node knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals the downstream node.
Basically tor provides a distributed network of servers (“onion routers”). Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
COMMAND-LINE OPTIONS
-h, -help
Display a short help message and exit.
-f FILE
Specify a new configuration file to contain further Tor configuration options. (Default: $HOME/.torrc, or @CONFDIR@/torrc if that file is not found)
–defaults-torrc FILE
Specify a file in which to find default values for Tor options. The contents of this file are overridden by those in the regular configuration file, and by those on the command line. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc-defaults.)
–hash-password
Generates a hashed password for control port access.
–list-fingerprint
Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
–verify-config
Verify the configuration file is valid.
–service install [–options command-line options]
Install an instance of Tor as a Windows service, with the provided command-line options. Current instructions can be found at https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#HowdoIrunmyTorrelayasanNTservice
–service remove|start|stop
Remove, start, or stop a configured Tor Windows service.
–nt-service
Used internally to implement a Windows service.
–list-torrc-options
List all valid options.
–version
Display Tor version and exit.
–quiet|–hush
Override the default console log. By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level “notice” and higher to the console. It stops doing so after it parses its configuration, if the configuration tells it to log anywhere else. You can override this behavior with the –hush option, which tells Tor to only send warnings and errors to the console, or with the –quiet option, which tells Tor not to log to the console at all.
Other options can be specified on the command-line in the format “–option value”, in the format “option value”, or in a configuration file. For instance, you can tell Tor to start listening for SOCKS connections on port 9999 by passing –SOCKSPort 9999 or SOCKSPort 9999 to it on the command line, or by putting “SOCKSPort 9999″ in the configuration file. You will need to quote options with spaces in them: if you want Tor to log all debugging messages to debug.log, you will probably need to say –Log debug file debug.log.
Options on the command line override those in configuration files. See the next section for more information.
THE CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
All configuration options in a configuration are written on a single line by default. They take the form of an option name and a value, or an option name and a quoted value (option value or option “value”). Anything after a # character is treated as a comment. Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside quoted values. To split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single backslash character () before the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but they must start at the beginning of a line.
By default, an option on the command line overrides an option found in the configuration file, and an option in a configuration file overrides one in the defaults file.
This rule is simple for options that take a single value, but it can become complicated for options that are allowed to occur more than once: if you specify four SOCKSPorts in your configuration file, and one more SOCKSPort on the command line, the option on the command line will replace all of the SOCKSPorts in the configuration file. If this isn’t what you want, prefix the option name with a plus sign, and it will be appended to the previous set of options instead.
Alternatively, you might want to remove every instance of an option in the configuration file, and not replace it at all: you might want to say on the command line that you want no SOCKSPorts at all. To do that, prefix the option name with a forward slash.
GENERAL OPTIONS
BandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB
A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the public network, this needs to be at the very least 30 KB (that is, 30720 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)
BandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB
Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server without impacting network performance.
RelayBandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB
If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
RelayBandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB
If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
PerConnBWBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB
If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay. You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
ClientTransportPlugin transport socks4|socks5 IP:PORT
ClientTransportPlugin transport exec path-to-binary [options]
In its first form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor client forwards its traffic to a SOCKS-speaking proxy on “IP:PORT”. It’s the duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge.
In its second form, when set along with a corresponding Bridge line, the Tor client launches the pluggable transport proxy executable in path-to-binary using options as its command-line options, and forwards its traffic to it. It’s the duty of that proxy to properly forward the traffic to the bridge.
ServerTransportPlugin transport exec path-to-binary [options]
The Tor relay launches the pluggable transport proxy in path-to-binary using options as its command-line options, and expects to receive proxied client traffic from it.
ConnLimit NUM
The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by “ulimit -H -n”). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.
You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
DisableNetwork 0|1
When this option is set, we don’t listen for or accept any connections other than controller connections, and we don’t make any outbound connections. Controllers sometimes use this option to avoid using the network until Tor is fully configured. (Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockets 0|1
If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all sockets to the size specified inConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the “Error creating network socket: No buffer space available” message, you are likely experiencing this problem.
The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this configuration option is a second-resort.
The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the problem.
You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the “no buffer space available” issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip time on long paths. (Default: 0)
ConstrainedSockSize N bytes|KB
When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
ControlPort PORT|auto
If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one or more ofHashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. (Setting both authentication methods means either method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. Set it to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0)
ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really dangerous. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
ControlSocket Path
Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
ControlSocketsGroupWritable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read and write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
HashedControlPassword hashed_password
Allow connections on the control port if they present the password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You can compute the hash of a password by running “tor –hash-password password“. You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more than one HashedControlPassword line.
CookieAuthentication 0|1
If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named “control_auth_cookie”, which Tor will create in its data directory. This authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem security. (Default: 0)
CookieAuthFile Path
If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1|Groupname
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0)
ControlPortWriteToFile Path
If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port when ControlPort is set to “auto”.
ControlPortFileGroupReadable 0|1
If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
DataDirectory DIR
Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
DirServer [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current (“v2″)-style directories, unless the “no-v2″ flag is given. If the “v1″ flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the “hs” flag is set, or if the “v1″ flag is set and the “no-hs” flag isnot set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the “bridge” flag is set. If a flag “orport=port” is given, Tor will use the given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a flag “v3ident=fp” is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprintfp.
If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same authorities they do.
DynamicDHGroups 0|1
If this option is set to 1, when running as a server, generate our own Diffie-Hellman group instead of using the one from Apache’s mod_ssl. This option may help circumvent censorship based on static Diffie-Hellman parameters. (Default: 0)
AlternateDirAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
AlternateHSAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint
These options behave as DirServer, but they replace fewer of the default directory authorities. Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but leaves the default hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. Similarly, AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities; and AlternateBridgeAuthority replaces the default bridge authority, but leaves the directory and hidden service authorities alone.
DisableAllSwap 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages, so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the User option to properly reduce Tor’s privileges. (Default: 0)
DisableDebuggerAttachment 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will attempt to prevent basic debugging attachment attempts by other processes. It has no impact for users who wish to attach if they have CAP_SYS_PTRACE or if they are root. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions, and that it may also work on *BSD systems (untested). Some modern Gnu/Linux systems such as Ubuntu have the kernel.yama.ptrace_scope sysctl and by default enable it as an attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for all user processes by default. This feature will attempt to limit the PTRACE scope for Tor specifically – it will not attempt to alter the system wide ptrace scope as it may not even exist. If you wish to attach to Tor with a debugger such as gdb or strace you will want to set this to 0 for the duration of your debugging. Normal users should leave it on. Disabling this option while Tor is running is prohibited. (Default: 1)
FetchDirInfoEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
FetchDirInfoExtraEarly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
FetchServerDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. (Default: 1)
FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is useful if you’re using the contributed “exitlist” script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
HTTPProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
HTTPProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others.
HTTPSProxy host[:port]
Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
HTTPSProxyAuthenticator username:password
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you want it to support others.
Socks4Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5Proxy host[:port]
Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
Socks5ProxyUsername username
Socks5ProxyPassword password
If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and 255 characters.
KeepalivePeriod NUM
To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] stderr|stdout|syslog
Send all messages between minSeverity and maxSeverity to the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The “syslog” value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using “notice” in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME
As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The “Log” option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
Log [domain,…]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] … file FILENAME
Log [domain,…]minSeverity[-maxSeverity] … stderr|stdout|syslog
As above, but select messages by range of log severity and by a set of “logging domains”. Each logging domain corresponds to an area of functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with ~ to indicate negation, and use * to indicate “all domains”. If you specify a severity range without a list of domains, it matches all domains.
This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two of Tor’s subsystems at a time.
The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs, protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge, acct, hist, and handshake. Domain names are case-insensitive.
For example, “Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout” sends to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all messages of severity notice or higher.
LogMessageDomains 0|1
If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly one. This doesn’t affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)
OutboundBindAddress IP
Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
PidFile FILE
On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
ProtocolWarnings 0|1
If 1, Tor will log with severity ‘warn’ various cases of other parties not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity ‘info’. (Default: 0)
RunAsDaemon 0|1
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect on Windows; instead you should use the –service command-line option. (Default: 0)
LogTimeGranularity NUM
Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor’s logs to NUM milliseconds. NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second. Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) “batch up” log messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
SafeLogging 0|1|relay
Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying information about what sites a user might have visited.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
User UID
On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
HardwareAccel 0|1
If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when available. (Default: 0)
AccelName NAME
When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine. Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.
AccelDir DIR
Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
AvoidDiskWrites 0|1
If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
TunnelDirConns 0|1
If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. (Default: 1)
PreferTunneledDirConns 0|1
If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
CircuitPriorityHalflife NUM1
If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which circuit’s cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn’t have to mess with it. (Default: not set)
DisableIOCP 0|1
If Tor was built to use the Libevent’s “bufferevents” networking code and you’re running on Windows, setting this option to 1 will tell Libevent not to use the Windows IOCP networking API. (Default: 1)
UserspaceIOCPBuffers 0|1
If IOCP is enabled (see DisableIOCP above), setting this option to 1 will tell Tor to disable kernel-space TCP buffers, in order to avoid needless copy operations and try not to run out of non-paged RAM. This feature is experimental; don’t use it yet unless you’re eager to help tracking down bugs. (Default: 0)
_UseFilteringSSLBufferevents 0|1
Tells Tor to do its SSL communication using a chain of bufferevents: one for SSL and one for networking. This option has no effect if bufferevents are disabled (in which case it can’t turn on), or if IOCP bufferevents are enabled (in which case it can’t turn off). This option is useful for debugging only; most users shouldn’t touch it. (Default: 0)
CountPrivateBandwidth 0|1
If this option is set, then Tor’s rate-limiting applies not only to remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
CLIENT OPTIONS
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if SocksPort, TransPort, DNSPort, or NATDPort is non-zero):
AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|…
If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is “middle,rendezvous”, and other choices are not advised.
ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1
This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, so using these relays might make your client stand out. (Default: 1)
Bridge [transport] IP:ORPort [fingerprint]
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at “IP:ORPort” as a “bridge” relaying into the Tor network. If “fingerprint” is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
If “transport” is provided, and matches to a ClientTransportPlugin line, we use that pluggable transports proxy to transfer data to the bridge.
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0|1
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
CircuitBuildTimeout NUM
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn’t open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used. (Default: 60 seconds)
CircuitIdleTimeout NUM
If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 hour)
CircuitStreamTimeout NUM
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60. (Default: 0)
ClientOnly 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a relay or serve directory requests. This config option is mostly meaningless: we added it back when we were considering having Tor clients auto-promote themselves to being relays if they were stable and fast enough. The current behavior is simply that Tor is a client unless ORPort or DirPort are configured. (Default: 0)
ExcludeNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. (Example: ExcludeNodes SlowServer, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed to override in order to keep working. For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, but you have excluded all of the hidden service’s introduction points, Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below).
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.
ExcludeExitNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node—that is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this list too. See also the caveats on the “ExitNodes” option below.
ExitNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns of nodes to use as exit node—that is, a node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network.
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won’t be able to browse the web.
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node. To keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides this option.
EntryNodes node,node,…
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and country codes of nodes to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes.
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
StrictNodes 0|1
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is necessary to perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download directory information. (Default: 0)
FascistFirewall 0|1
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see FirewallPorts). This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
FirewallPorts PORTS
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
ReachableAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]…
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that “accept” is understood unless “reject” is explicitly provided. For example, ‘ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80′ means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise. (Default: ‘accept *:*’.)
ReachableDirAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]…
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
ReachableORAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]…
Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPSProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
The separation between ReachableORAddresses and ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to port 80.
HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie [service-name]
Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus “.onion”, and valid auth cookies contain 22 characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden services can be configured to require authorization using the HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option.
CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden service client circuits which have not moved closer to connecting to their destination hidden service when their internal state has not changed for the duration of the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish connecting to their destination hidden services. In either case, another set of introduction and rendezvous circuits for the same destination hidden service will be launched. (Default: 0)
CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout 0|1
If 1, Tor will close unfinished hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits after the current circuit-build timeout. Otherwise, such circuits will be left open, in the hope that they will finish connecting to their destinations. In either case, another rendezvous circuit for the same destination client will be launched. (Default: 0)
LongLivedPorts PORTS
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node will go down before the stream is finished. Note that the list is also honored for circuits (both client and service side) involving hidden services whose virtual port is in this list. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
MapAddress address newaddress
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will transform to newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to www.example.com to exit via torserver (where torserver is the nickname of the server), use “MapAddress www.example.com www.example.com.torserver.exit”. If the value is prefixed with a “*.”, matches an entire domain. For example, if you always want connections to example.com and any if its subdomains to exit via torserver (where torserver is the nickname of the server), use “MapAddress *.example.com *.example.com.torserver.exit”. (Note the leading “*.” in each part of the directive.) You can also redirect all subdomains of a domain to a single address. For example, “MapAddress *.example.com www.example.com”.
NOTES:
When evaluating MapAddress expressions Tor stops when it hits the most recently added expression that matches the requested address. So if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to 1.1.1.1:
MapAddress www.torproject.org 2.2.2.2
MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
Tor evaluates the MapAddress configuration until it finds no matches. So if you have the following in your torrc, www.torproject.org will map to 2.2.2.2:
MapAddress 1.1.1.1 2.2.2.2
MapAddress www.torproject.org 1.1.1.1
The following MapAddress expression is invalid (and will be ignored) because you cannot map from a specific address to a wildcard address:
MapAddress www.torproject.org *.torproject.org.torserver.exit
Using a wildcard to match only part of a string (as in *ample.com) is also invalid.
NewCircuitPeriod NUM
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. For hidden services, this applies to the last time a circuit was used, not the first. (Default: 10 minutes)
MaxClientCircuitsPending NUM
Do not allow more than NUM circuits to be pending at a time for handling client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it, but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32)
NodeFamily node,node,…
The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, constitute a “family” of similar or co-administered servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times. In addition to nodes, you can also list IP address and ranges and country codes in {curly braces}.
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1
If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are “too close” on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are “too close” if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
SOCKSPort [address:]port|auto [isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application connections via SOCKS. Set it to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 9050)
The isolation flags arguments give Tor rules for which streams received on this SOCKSPort are allowed to share circuits with one another. Recognized isolation flags are:
IsolateClientAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams from a different client address. (On by default and strongly recommended; you can disable it with NoIsolateClientAddr.)
IsolateSOCKSAuth
Don’t share circuits with streams for which different SOCKS authentication was provided. (On by default; you can disable it with NoIsolateSOCKSAuth.)
IsolateClientProtocol
Don’t share circuits with streams using a different protocol. (SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections, and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different protocols.)
IsolateDestPort
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a different destination port.
IsolateDestAddr
Don’t share circuits with streams targetting a different destination address.
SessionGroup=INT
If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams on this port to share circuits with streams from every other port with the same session group. (By default, streams received on different SOCKSPorts, TransPorts, etc are always isolated from one another. This option overrides that behavior.)
SOCKSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple SOCKSPort entries, and provide addresses for SOCKSPort entries, so SOCKSListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility, SOCKSListenAddress is only allowed when SOCKSPort is just a port number.)
SocksPolicy policy,policy,…
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
SocksTimeout NUM
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: 2 minutes)
TokenBucketRefillInterval NUM [msec|second]
Set the refill interval of Tor’s token bucket to NUM milliseconds. NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. Note that the configured bandwidth limits are still expressed in bytes per second: this option only affects the frequency with which Tor checks to see whether previously exhausted connections may read again. (Default: 100 msec)
TrackHostExits host,.domain,…
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a ‘.’, it is treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a ‘.’, it means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
TrackHostExitsExpire NUM
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 0|1
When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
UseBridges 0|1
When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the “Bridge” config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory guards. (Default: 0)
UseEntryGuards 0|1
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Default: 1)
NumEntryGuards NUM
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
SafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. (Default: 0)
TestSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking DNS requests. (Default: 0)
WarnUnsafeSocks 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)
VirtualAddrNetwork Address/bits
When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to “10.192.0.0/10″ or “172.16.0.0/12″. The default VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and ::__IHACKLOG_REMOTE_IMAGE_AUTODOWN_BLOCK__::0 rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. (Default: 0)
AllowDotExit 0|1
If enabled, we convert “www.google.com.foo.exit” addresses on the SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into “www.google.com” addresses that exit from the node “foo”. Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
FastFirstHopPK 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.
Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
TransPort [address:]port|auto [isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags.
TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs’ pf or Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0)
TransListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an entire network. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple TransPort entries, and provide addresses for TransPort entries, so TransListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility, TransListenAddress is only allowed when TransPort is just a port number.)
NATDPort [address:]port|auto [isolation flags]
Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol. Use 0 if you don’t want to allow NATD connections. Set the port to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags.
This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple NATDPort entries, and provide addresses for NATDPort entries, so NATDListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility, NATDListenAddress is only allowed when NATDPort is just a port number.)
AutomapHostsOnResolve 0|1
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address that ends with one of the suffixes inAutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making “.onion” addresses work with applications that resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0)
AutomapHostsSuffixes SUFFIX,SUFFIX,…
A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with AutomapHostsOnResolve. The “.” suffix is equivalent to “all addresses.” (Default: .exit,.onion).
DNSPort [address:]port|auto [isolation flags]
If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve them anonymously. Set the port to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0)
DNSListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple DNSPort entries, and provide addresses for DNSPort entries, so DNSListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward compatibility, DNSListenAddress is only allowed when DNSPort is just a port number.)
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1)
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0|1
If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) unless a exit node is specifically requested (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a controller request). (Default: 1)
DownloadExtraInfo 0|1
If true, Tor downloads and caches “extra-info” documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the information in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0)
FallbackNetworkstatusFile FILENAME
If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the authorities. (Default: None)
WarnPlaintextPorts port,port,…
Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: 23,109,110,143)
RejectPlaintextPorts port,port,…
Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None)
AllowSingleHopCircuits 0|1
When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays that have the AllowSingleHopExits option turned on to build one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)
OptimisticData 0|1|auto
When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP where the client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to auto, Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus. (Default: auto)
Tor2webMode 0|1
When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services non-anonymously. This option also disables client connections to non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It must only be used when running a tor2web Hidden Service web proxy. To enable this option the compile time flag –enable-tor2webmode must be specified. (Default: 0)
UseMicrodescriptors 0|1|auto
Microdescriptors are a smaller version of the information that Tor needs in order to build its circuits. Using microdescriptors makes Tor clients download less directory information, thus saving bandwidth. Directory caches need to fetch regular descriptors and microdescriptors, so this option doesn’t save any bandwidth for them. If this option is set to “auto” (recommended) then it is on for all clients that do not set FetchUselessDescriptors. (Default: auto)
PathBiasCircThreshold NUM
PathBiasNoticeRate NUM
PathBiasDisableRate NUM
PathBiasScaleThreshold NUM
PathBiasScaleFactor NUM
These options override the default behavior of Tor’s (currently experimental) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain fraction of circuits through that node fail after the first hop. The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate and PathBiasDisableRate options control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we won’t warn about it or disable it, respectively. When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a guard, we divide our observations by PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations don’t get swamped by old ones.
By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .70, 0.0, 200, and 4 respectively.
SERVER OPTIONS
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort is non-zero):
Address address
The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address. This IP address is the one used to tell clients and other servers where to find your Tor server; it doesn’t affect the IP that your Tor client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the *ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options.
AllowSingleHopExits 0|1
This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use servers that set this option, since most clients have ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
AssumeReachable 0|1
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set, this option instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list all connected servers as running.
BridgeRelay 0|1
Sets the relay to act as a “bridge” with respect to relaying connections from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay descriptor to the public directory authorities.
ContactInfo email_address
Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an email address.
ExitPolicy policy,policy,…
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form “accept|reject ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]“. If /MASK is omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use “*” to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). PORT can be a single port number, an interval of ports “FROM_PORT-TO_PORT“, or “*”. If PORT is omitted, that means “*”.
For example, “accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*” would reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept anything else.
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the “private” alias instead of an address. These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with “accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*”, though that may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details about internal and reserved IP address space.
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it all on one line.
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
reject *:25
reject *:119
reject *:135-139
reject *:445
reject *:563
reject *:1214
reject *:4661-4666
reject *:6346-6429
reject *:6699
reject *:6881-6999
accept *:*
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1
Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
MaxOnionsPending NUM
If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
MyFamily node,node,…
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare that they are in the same ‘family’, Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would compromise its concealment.
Nickname name
Set the server’s nickname to ‘name’. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
NumCPUs num
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can’t tell. (Default: 0)
ORPort [address:]PORT|auto [flags]
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. Set it to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0)
Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort:
**NoAdvertise**::
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
NoAdvertise is specified, we don’t advertise, but listen anyway. This
can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for
example, one that’s opened on our firewall) is somewhere else.
**NoListen**::
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
NoListen is specified, we don’t bind, but advertise anyway. This
can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall’s port
forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.
**IPv4Only**::
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
address, only listen to the IPv4 address.
**IPv6Only**::
If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6
address, only listen to the IPv6 address.
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and
IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive.
ORListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with ORPort now
that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
PortForwarding 0|1
Attempt to automatically forward the DirPort and ORPort on a NAT router connecting this Tor server to the Internet. If set, Tor will try both NAT-PMP (common on Apple routers) and UPnP (common on routers from other manufacturers). (Default: 0)
PortForwardingHelper filename|pathname
If PortForwarding is set, use this executable to configure the forwarding. If set to a filename, the system path will be searched for the executable. If set to a path, only the specified path will be executed. (Default: tor-fw-helper)
PublishServerDescriptor 0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge,…
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as a relay. You can choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is “1″, which means “if running as a server, publish the appropriate descriptors to the authorities”.
ShutdownWaitLength NUM
When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down: we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After NUM seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
HeartbeatPeriod N minutes|hours|days|weeks
Log a heartbeat message every HeartbeatPeriod seconds. This is a log level info message, designed to let you know your Tor server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours)
AccountingMax N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are always “available”.
AccountingStart day|week|month [day] HH:MM
Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MMon the dayth day of one month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) Ifweek is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Default: “month 1 0:00″)
RefuseUnknownExits 0|1|auto
Prevent nodes that don’t appear in the consensus from exiting using this relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such nodes; if it’s 0, we never do, and if the option is “auto”, then we do whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus. (Default: auto)
ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix “resolv.conf” file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 0|1
If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in “example.com”, and a client tries to connect to “www”, the client will be connected to “www.example.com”. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSTestAddresses address,address,…
When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, and we’ll reset our exit policy to “reject :“. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: “www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org”)
ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames containing illegal characters (like @ and ::__IHACKLOG_REMOTE_IMAGE_AUTODOWN_BLOCK__::1 rather than sending them to an exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
BridgeRecordUsageByCountry 0|1
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
ServerDNSRandomizeCase 0|1
When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. This so-called “0×20 hack” helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. For more information, see “Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through 0×20-Bit Encoding”. This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
GeoIPFile filename
A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
CellStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
DirReqStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, a Tor directory writes statistics on the number and response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 1)
EntryStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
ExitPortStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
ConnDirectionStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the bidirectional use of connections to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
ExtraInfoStatistics 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. (Default: 1)
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
When this option is enabled, Tor routers allow EXTEND request to localhost, RFC1918 addresses, and so on. This can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. (Default: 0)
DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if DirPort is non-zero):
AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at [email protected] if you think you should be a directory.
DirPortFrontPage FILENAME
When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as “/” on the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
V1AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
V2AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
V3AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at least 0.2.0.x).
VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities provide this service optionally. See RecommendedVersions, RecommendedClientVersions, andRecommendedServerVersions.
NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1
When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with the flag “Named” if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See approved-routers in theFILES section below.
HSAuthoritativeDir 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also accepts and serves v0 hidden service descriptors, which are produced and used by Tor 0.2.1.x and older. (Default: 0)
HidServDirectoryV2 0|1
When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
BridgeAuthoritativeDir 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
DirPort [address:]PORT|auto [flags]
If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port. Set it to “auto” to have Tor pick a port for you. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0)
The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort.
DirListenAddress IP[:PORT]
Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
This option is deprecated; you can get the same behavior with DirPort now
that it supports NoAdvertise and explicit addresses.
DirPolicy policy,policy,…
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
FetchV2Networkstatus 0|1
If set, we try to fetch the (obsolete, unused) version 2 network status consensus documents from the directory authorities. No currently supported Tor version uses them. (Default: 0)
DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
RecommendedVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When this is set thenVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
RecommendedClientVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
RecommendedServerVersions STRING
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too.
ConsensusParams STRING
STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include in the “params” line of its networkstatus vote.
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary “Address” elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. (Default: 0)
AuthDirBadDir AddressPattern…
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set.
AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern…
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set.
AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern…
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed as “valid” in any network status document that this authority publishes.
AuthDirReject AddressPattern…
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that will never be listed at all in any network status document that this authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted for publication by this authority.
AuthDirBadDirCCs CC,…
AuthDirBadExitCCs CC,…
AuthDirInvalidCCs CC,…
AuthDirRejectCCs CC,…
Authoritative directories only. These options contain a comma-separated list of country codes such that any server in one of those country codes will be marked as a bad directory/bad exit/invalid for use, or rejected entirely.
AuthDirListBadDirs 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.)
AuthDirListBadExits 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the fingerprints file. This acts as a “panic button” if we get hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to “0″ for “no limit”. (Default: 2)
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr NUM
Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
AuthDirFastGuarantee N bytes|KB|MB|GB
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or more. (Default: 100 KB)
AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee N bytes|KB|MB|GB
Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB)
BridgePassword Password
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used by the (only partially implemented) “bridge community” design, where a community of bridge relay operators all use an alternate bridge directory authority, and their target user audience can periodically fetch the list of available community bridges to stay up-to-date. (Default: not set)
V3AuthVotingInterval N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting interval. Note that voting will actuallyhappen at an interval chosen by consensus from all the authorities’ preferred intervals. This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
V3AuthVoteDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
V3AuthDistDelay N minutes|hours
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes)
V3AuthNIntervalsValid NUM
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at least 2. (Default: 3)
V3BandwidthsFile FILENAME
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the bandwidth-authority generated file storing information on relays’ measured bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset)
V3AuthUseLegacyKey 0|1
If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its own signing key, but also with a “legacy” key and certificate with a different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0)
RephistTrackTime N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn’t changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 0|1
When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories. (Default: 1)
HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORY
Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an existing directory.
HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET]
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the same port on 127.0.0.1 over TCP. You may override the target port, address, or both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1
If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. (Default: 1)
HiddenServiceVersion version,version,…
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,…
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients only. The auth-type can either be ‘basic’ for a general-purpose authorization protocol or ‘stealth’ for a less scalable protocol that also hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in their configuration file using HidServAuth.
RendPostPeriod N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
TestingTorNetwork 0|1
If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
AssumeReachable 1
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
CountPrivateBandwidth 1
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses 1
V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval N minutes|hours
Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay N minutes|hours
Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay N minutes|hours
Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability N minutes|hours
After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime N minutes|hours
Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this time. Changing this requires thatTestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 10 minutes)
SIGNALS
Tor catches the following signals:
SIGTERM
Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
SIGINT
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting. (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
SIGHUP
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
SIGUSR1
Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
SIGUSR2
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by sending a SIGHUP.
SIGCHLD
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it can clean up.
SIGPIPE
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
SIGXFSZ
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
FILES
@CONFDIR@/torrc
The configuration file, which contains “option value” pairs.
@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
DataDirectory/cached-status/
The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. Mostly obsolete.
DataDirectory/cached-consensus and/or cached-microdesc-consensus
The most recent consensus network status document we’ve downloaded.
DataDirectory/cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new
These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router. The “.new” file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
DataDirectory/cached-microdescs and cached-microdescs.new
These files hold downloaded microdescriptors. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router. The “.new” file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-microdescs file.
DataDirectory/cached-routers and cached-routers.new
Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead.
DataDirectory/state
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in the file. These include:
The current entry guards and their status.
The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see below).
When the file was last written
What version of Tor generated the state file
A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router descriptors.
DataDirectory/bw_accounting
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the ‘state’ file as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie
Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is enabled.
DataDirectory/keys/*
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
DataDirectory/fingerprint
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key.
DataDirectory/approved-routers
Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see NamingAuthoritativeDirectory). This file lists nickname to identity bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by whitespace. See your fingerprint file in the DataDirectory for an example line. If the nickname is !reject then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is !invalid then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
DataDirectory/router-stability
Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file also contains authorization data for all clients.
HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key
The private key for this hidden service.
HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys
Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by authorized clients.
SEE ALSO
privoxy(1), tsocks(1), torify(1)
https://www.torproject.org/
BUGS
Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
AUTHORS
Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].
斗铠 298
刘斌一愣，他苦笑：“大都督，将来要如何，这由不得我们的，
大都督，说句心里话，倘若有可能，谁愿为鲜卑人卖命？谁不知道这是辱没祖宗的事？但我们不能光凭着自己意气用事啊，几千兄弟跟着我们，还有他们的家眷，这是一万多条性命，我们要为他们着想，要帮他们找口饭吃，不能让他们饿死啊！
这乱世中，我们势单力薄，只能勉强挣扎求生。谁能给我们一条活路，我们就跟谁，这由不得我们自己选的。大都督，您得了气运，可以随心所欲，但我们这些苦命人，只能随波逐流，让您见笑了。”
孟聚叹了口气。刘斌的话中暗暗隐含责备，当年黑山军明确表示要投靠孟聚，但却被孟聚所拒。
“军师，当年，情形所迫，我没法接纳你们，确实有不得已的苦衷。”
“末将明白的。其实，末将自己也想过了，若换了末将自己，也不可能答应的。当时大都督您的处境，确实也不宜接纳我们。”
大家都是聪明人，有些话就心照不宣了。当时孟聚只拥有区区三镇地盘，兵力也不过万人而已，如果接纳数千人的黑山叛军进来，那就有鸠占鹊巢的危险了。
但现在，形势已经不同了。孟聚坐拥三分北魏，拥兵数万，实力和地盘比起当日已有了飞跃的提升。这时候，再接纳黑山军进来的话，他已完全有能力消化和容纳他们了。
孟聚心中有数。阮振山是猛将，刘斌是智将，徐良更是智勇双全、沉稳刚毅的大将之才。孟聚有心招揽他们，但无奈有先前的芥蒂在，他实在不好意思主动开口了。
倒是刘斌善解人意。他说：“现在，末将等且在慕容家麾下效命，但我们不是鲜卑世家将门，他们也不会真心信任我们，说不定有那么一天，我们得求大都督赏碗饭给我们吃了，到时候还请大都督收留了。”
“军师客气了，只要诸位来投，孟某十分欢迎。倒靴以迎。”
两人聊了一阵，刘斌便自己告辞了，孟聚将他送了出去。送到厅堂门口时，孟聚突然想起一件事：“军师，今天徐旅帅说，倘若我要继续南下的话，你们黑山旅不惜动武也要阻拦我——这是真的吗？”
刘斌顿住了脚步。他望了一眼孟聚，脸上露出苦涩的笑容。
“大都督，您是聪明人，你自己都知道答案的事，何必还来问我呢？”
“哦？”孟聚一扬剑眉。他不说话，只是望着对方。
刘斌低声说：“今天徐兄弟虽然那么说了，但事实上，如果您执意要南下的话——慕容家给我们的指令，没允许我们动武阻拦你。”
“也就是说，徐旅帅他。。。”
尽管四周再无旁人，刘斌还是把声音压得很低：“虚张声势罢了。慕容破当面给我和徐兄弟颁布了命令，他当面跟我们说的：‘你们要向大都督表明朝廷的态度，态度要严正坚决，但若是东平军坚持南下或者挑衅的话，你们必须立即后退三十里。有敢擅启衅与东平军交战者，立斩！’——这是他的原话，大都督你知道就好。”
孟聚深吸一口气，朝廷的底线他已经知道了，心中更有把握。他笑道：“谢谢，刘军师。你这个人情，我记得了。”
“大都督这么说，末将很是感动——不过，您还是把这事忘了更好吧。千万勿要泄露，否则末将真要被你害死了。”
刘斌苦笑着拱拱手，告辞而去。
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
天佑二年的四月下旬，东平军抵达济州的楚南府，结束了漫长的南下战役，好看的小说:寻爱殇txt下载。
孟聚给朝廷写了一份奏折，以北疆大都督的名义向朝廷报告，说是南下的东平兵马兵疲力乏，饷缺粮乏，伤病众多。由于征战疲惫，连孟聚自己都病了，实在无力再坚持继续南下了。所以，他请求朝廷允许东平兵马驻在济州的楚南府休整，待恢复体力和士气再继续南下为朝廷出力。
写完这份奏折，孟聚很有点沾沾自喜自己的含蓄：南下以来，东平军一直独行其事，攻城略寨，想打哪个就打哪个，想占哪里就占哪里，大魏朝的官，想杀就杀想用就用，何时把慕容家的朝廷放在眼里了？.
现在，为了在楚南府休整几天这点区区小事，自己却郑重其事地向朝廷去了文请示，想来皇帝和太子都是聪明人，他们该能明白其中的暗示吧？
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
连绵的雨季终于过去，天空露出了一片湛蓝。就在这晴朗的天气里，朝廷的颁旨钦差姗姗抵达济州楚南。
尽管彼此都明白是怎么回事，但面子上的功夫还是要做到的，孟聚领着东平军的一众将校在城门处迎接钦差大驾。
看到在随从们簇拥下走近的颁旨钦差，孟聚不由一愣：来颁圣旨的这位钦差，不正是当初自己的监军马公公吗？
对这位内侍马公公，孟聚的印象还是很深的。当初，孟聚在相州助战时候，马贵就是他的监军。在相处期间，这位内侍知情识趣，给孟聚的感觉很不错，大家并肩作战，甚至相处出了不浅的交情。后来，孟聚擅自出走回归，马贵竭力反对，被孟聚绑起来关了小黑屋，却也没伤他性命。
那边的马贵却也看到了孟聚，他急忙推开众人，快步走到孟聚跟前，躬身行礼：“大都督安好，鲍鹏山新说水浒txt下载！上次一别，大都督，咱们可是一年未见了，咱家向您请安了！”
孟聚也很热情：“马公公安好？孟某是粗鲁武夫不懂事，上次多多失礼。公公海涵，某要见怪。”
马公公连连摆手，态度十分诚挚：“唉。大都督莫要这么说。上次的事，确实是咱家鲁莽了。大都督要事在身，军情火急。咱家还要多嘴唠叨，也怪不得大都督行那霹雳手段。说起来，咱家还要多谢大都督手下留情了呢，哈哈！”
两人都“呵呵”地笑着，笑容甚是爽朗，俨然相逢一笑泯恩怨的样子，哪怕是最眼尖、最善于观颜察色的人都没法在他们脸上找到半分不自然的样子。
叙旧后，马贵便当场颁了圣旨——朝廷的圣旨一如既往。骈四俪六，抑扬顿挫，音节优美，除了大家都听不懂外真是没别的缺点了。好在水货秀才孟聚已不同往日，他身边有了一个货真价实的举人助手了，文先生细声帮他翻译了朝廷的圣旨：
东平军南下勤王，击败了叛军的诸路兵马。收复城镇无数。虽未告全功，但大都督已为平叛大业作出了突出的贡献，朝廷对大都督勤劳王事的精神是十分赞赏的。至于相州的叛军残孽，那不过纤芥之疾，朝廷已有了万全的安排。大都督不必为此担心，只需安心养病就好。
听文先生翻译完了圣旨，孟聚微微蹙眉——慕容家的答复跟他的期望差得太远了。
他望着马贵：“公公，您带来的朝廷旨意——就这些了？”
马贵笑得如花朵般灿烂：“呵呵，还有呢：陛下对大都督甚是关怀，听闻大都督身染微恙，陛下很是心忧，差遣咱家一路急赶过来，赐下了深山人参四根、千年雪莲半斤、培元归真丹十枚——大都督，这些药材可是外面难见的宫中珍藏，前些日子燕妃小恙想用上一点，陛下都不许的，现在可是全赐给您了！
还有，宫里医术最好的吴太医，陛下也差他跟咱家一同过来了，大都督，陛下对您的这份信重，真让咱家羡慕得无话可说啊，呵呵！”
孟聚脸色阴沉得能滴下水来了，但马贵只当看不到，他笑眯眯地回头招呼：“吴太医，快过来，帮大都督好好诊治一番。”
随着喊声，吴太医从队伍里巍巍颤颤地过来了，他满脸皱纹，头发雪白，几缕长须甚是俊逸，倒是有几分名医的风采。
吴太医向孟聚一躬：“大都督，老朽吴同，奉陛下之命来为您诊治了。老朽学艺不精，有不到之处，还望大都督海涵。”
孟聚按捺住心中不快，淡淡道：“我也没什么大事，不必劳烦吴老先生了吧？”
“大都督不必客气，老朽也就看看，不费什么事的。”
说话间，吴太医已经抓起了孟聚的手腕开始诊脉。过了一阵，他眉头深蹙，脸露忧色，凝重地说：“大都督最近辛劳过度，湿寒入脉，邪毒侵体，再加昼夜劳神忧思，脾虚甚重。。。若不及时调理，老朽看，不久怕是将有不忍说之事啊。”
“啊，这怎生是好？”马贵忧形于色：“吴太医，要知道，大都督可是陛下最倚重的臣子，请您赶紧施展妙手诊治，需要什么药材，只管开口就好。”
“这，大都督太过操劳，这病是累出来的啊。汤药固然是缺不得，但关键还是得休养。所以，要治好这病，关键还是切忌劳累，切忌忧思劳神，需得好生卧床静养三个月。”
“大都督，你乃国家重柱，朝廷将来倚重您的地方还多，您的健康不单是您的事，还关系朝廷社稷啊！大都督，您可一定要听吴太医的话，好好休养身体啊！行军打仗之类的事，你可千万不要再做了啊！”
马贵公公拉住孟聚的手，潸然泪下，声情并茂，仿佛孟聚下一刻就要撒手人寰了，老子要不是看过赵本山的卖拐，还不给你们两个忽悠死？看着马贵和这吴太医一唱一和，孟聚顿时恶向胆边生：一不给地盘二不给军饷，你们这样来忽悠老子，真当老子没见识过“砖家”和“祖传老军医”不成？
“吴太医，你直说好了，我到底还有多长的命？”
“这——大都督身体健硕，底子是很好的，只是最近劳累过度。伤了元气。。。倘若不好生休养的话，怕是。。。”吴太医不住地摇头叹气：“不会太远了。”
孟聚点头，声音悲愤又低沉：“我明白了。吾戎马多年。死生之事，本座亦是看得淡了。大丈夫不惧一死，只是。不能看到国贼授首，吾纵在九泉之下亦是不甘！
马公公，既然我已病入膏肓，也不必劳烦太医费心了，大丈夫自当死于沙场，岂能病死榻前？我这就点齐兵马奔相州去，哪怕就剩一口气，也要先把拓跋雄给斩了！
王虎、齐鹏。浩杰，你们回各自营中，点齐兵马，咱们今天就出发，不捣相州，咱们誓不还师！”
将军们齐齐向前踏出一步，应声如雷：“遵大都督钧令！”
孟聚悍然发飙。马公公吓了一跳。他扯着孟聚的袖子：“大都督，咱们单独说两句？”
孟聚看看他，摆摆手，众将纷纷退下。马贵也遣开了自己的随从，他陪着笑脸：“大都督身患重疾却是依然忧心国事。这份忧国情怀，委实令人敬佩。但诛杀国贼固然重要，却也不必太急切，大都督还是养好身体才好再作打算。
对了，临行前，陛下还给了咱家一份手谕，方才看到大都督病容憔悴，咱家心中实在难过，心神大乱，一时却是忘记拿出来了，差点误了大事，咱家这就给大都督说说。”
慕容破的第二份圣旨来得十分简洁，只是说朝廷闻知东平军征战疲惫，军需急缺，朝廷已命舒州都督张全押运一批粮草和军备器械前来劳军，补充东平军的征战损耗，东平只需在济州等候即可，补给物资计有粮食两千石、斗铠二百副、饷银一百万两等，穿越千年之皇家丫头最新章节。
看完这第二份圣旨，孟聚点头，事情该是这样才对，拿几根烂人参就想把自己糊弄过去？慕容破该不会那么天真，这样的价码才是自己停止南下的交换条件，倒也丰厚。
“舒州的张都督何时能抵达济州？”
马公公拍着胸口：“咱家出发的时候，张都督已经押着物资上路，最多不超过一个月，张都督准到，大都督放心就是。”
孟聚闷哼一声：“公公，这可是你说的：三十天之内，我要看到车队入济州。马公公，你就不要走了，多日不见，我也怪想念你的，张都督来之前，你就在这边陪我聊天喝茶好了。”
“啊，”马贵一愣，他结结巴巴地说：“大都督，咱家说一个月，这是预期时间，但舒州至此，沿途颇多盗贼叛军盘踞，若是辎重队伍在道上出了点意外耽搁了行程，那也是常有的事。。。这如何说得准呢？”
孟聚打断马贵，他斩钉截铁地说：“这个我不管！三十日内张都督如果不至，我军立即南下！”
“但万一张都督在道上出意外耽搁了的话。。。”
“如有意外，那就是马公公你运气不好了——我军南下，大军行进，总是要祭了旗才好开拔的。”
明白孟聚的意思，马公公的脸唰地变得惨白。他惨然道：“大都督，您即使要。。。那也是无用啊。咱家是陛下的奴婢而已，卑贱之人。咱家这种人，宫中数不胜数，纵然死上几百一千，陛下不会在意，朝廷也不会心疼的。”
孟聚闷哼一声，他何尝不知道，抓个太监做人质毫无意但问题是，他实在没法确定慕容破是真的打算破财消灾还是只是在使那拖延之计。
如果这份圣旨只是一纸空文，自己却被这纸空文骗了，傻傻地在济州观望等上几个月，眼睁睁看着拓跋雄和边军残部都被消灭了，到时朝廷轻飘飘说上一句：“舒州所运押运物资在道上被乱兵所劫，无法抵达。朝廷已经下旨惩戒张全，罚俸两月。”——那时候，自己还能怎么办？难道还真要起兵南下攻打洛京去吗？
看着孟聚脸色阴沉，马贵亦是心下忐忑，他小心翼翼地说：“大都督，咱家有一计，愿为大都督献策！”
孟聚斜眼瞥他一眼：“有屁就放！”
马贵也不敢卖关子，急忙说：“大都督，咱家卑贱之人，不值什么。但这边的黑山旅，一个整旅连官带兵三千多号人，还有那么多的装备和辎重，总比咱家值钱多了。大都督干脆派兵将他们缴械了收押，等张都督押运来了再放人好了。”
孟聚瞪马贵一眼，心中却是啼笑皆非：这个死太监，不要脸又贪生怕死。只要自己能脱身，他还是真敢引祸水东流啊！
这真是坑队友的最佳典范了。
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
（金键盘还有四天结束，大家手上还有金键盘年度作家免费票和月票的，请支持猪一下，投在年度作者上吧。猪发现自己居然是十八了！深深感谢诸位捧场的读者朋友们！谢谢你们！猪只要免费票就好，不要出钱买。
另外，再次给猪朋友的书打个广告，《天神》，升级流玄幻小说，实力作者，更新稳定有保障，情节流畅，大家有空去看下哇。）(未完待续。如果您喜欢这部作品，欢迎您来投推荐票、月票，您的支持，就是我最大的动力。)
测试
ＲＴ
Hello world!
Welcome to WordPress. This is your first post. Edit or delete it, then start blogging!